Implementation of Ring Oscillators Based Physical Unclonable Functions with Independent Bits in the Response by Bernard, Florent et al.
Implementation of Ring Oscillators Based Physical
Unclonable Functions with Independent Bits in the
Response
Florent Bernard, Viktor Fischer, Crina Costea, Robert Fouquet
To cite this version:
Florent Bernard, Viktor Fischer, Crina Costea, Robert Fouquet. Implementation of Ring Os-
cillators Based Physical Unclonable Functions with Independent Bits in the Response. Inter-
national Journal of Reconfigurable Computing, Hindawi Publishing Corporation, 2012, 2012,
Article ID 168961, 11 p. <ujm-00667692>
HAL Id: ujm-00667692
https://hal-ujm.archives-ouvertes.fr/ujm-00667692
Submitted on 8 Feb 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Implementation of Ring Oscillators Based Physical
Unclonable Functions with Independent Bits in the
Response
Florent BERNARD, Viktor FISCHER, Crina COSTEA, Robert FOUQUET
Universite´ de Lyon
CNRS, UMR5516, Laboratoire Hubert Curien
F-42000, Saint-Etienne, France
crina.costea@etu.univ-st-etienne.fr,{florent.bernard, fischer, robert.fouquet}@univ-st-etienne.fr
Abstract—The paper analyzes and proposes some enhance-
ments of Ring Oscillators based Physical Unclonable Functions
(PUFs). PUFs are used to extract a unique signature of an
integrated circuit in order to authenticate a device and/or to
generate a key. We show that designers of RO PUFs implemented
in FPGAs need a precise control of placement and routing and
an appropriate selection of ROs pairs to get independents bits
in the PUF response. We provide a method to identify which
comparisons are suitable when selecting pairs of ROs. Dealing
with power consumption, we propose a simple improvement that
reduces the consumption of the PUF published by Suh et al. in
2007 by up to 96.6%. Last but not least, we point out that ring
oscillators significantly influence one another and can even be
locked. This questions the reliability of the PUF and should be
taken into account during the design.
Index Terms—Physical unclonable functions (PUFs), reconfig-
urable device, cryptographic key generation, IC authentication
I. INTRODUCTION
Security in integrated circuits (ICs) became a very important
problem due to high information security requirements. In
order to assure authenticity and confidentiality, cryptographic
keys are used to encrypt the information. Several solutions
were proposed for key generation, each with their upsides and
downsides.
Confidential keys can be generated using True Random Num-
ber Generators (TRNGs) and stored in volatile or non volatile
memories. Saving the confidential key in a non volatile mem-
ory inside the device ensures that the key will never be lost
and that it will not be disclosed in case of passive attacks.
On the other hand, non volatile memories are easy targets for
invasive attacks [5]. Volatile memories are typical for Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Storing the confiden-
tial key in a volatile memory permits to erase the memory
contents in case of invasive attack detection. This implies the
use of a communication channel to transmit the key after
device configuration [5]. Communication channels are usually
easy to corrupt and information can be easily intercepted.
The confidentiality and authenticity of designs are therefore
compromised. A solution is backing-up the embedded volatile
memory block with a battery. However, it was proved that
battery-backed RAMs content can be read after a long period
of storage [2],[1],[17],[9] even if the memory is not powered
any more. Thus, the need of generating secret keys inside the
IC became obvious.
An alternative to TRNG for key generation is the Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF). PUFs are functions that extract
a unique signature of an IC, based on randomness during
the manufacturing process. This signature can be used as
device-dependent key or device identification code. The main
advantage of this principle introduced by Pappu et al. in [14],
[15] is the fact that the key does not need to be stored
in the device and it is thus harder to disclose. Based on
intrinsic physical characteristics of circuits obtained during the
manufacturing process, the extracted signature is impossible to
reproduce by a different IC or by an attacker. PUFs work on
challenge-response pairs. The challenge is usually a stimulus
sent from outside the device, and the response is the signature
of the circuit.
The quality of a PUF is determined mainly by its uniqueness
and its reliability. To quantify these properties of a PUF, two
types of response variations: intra- (for reliability) and inter-
(for uniqueness) chip variations [18] are used. The intra-chip
variation refers to the responses of the same PUF (the same
device) at the same challenge, regardless of environmental
changes (e.g. temperature, voltage). In the ideal case, this
variation should be 0. This means that the response of the PUF
for a given challenge should always be the same. The intra-
chip variation measures the reproducibility of the response.
The function must be able to reproduce the same response
over and over again, especially in the case of reconfigurable
devices.
The inter-chip variation refers to the responses of different
PUFs (different devices) at the same challenge. Ideally, this
variation should be of 50%, meaning that every bit is equally
likely to be a zero or a one. If this variation is close to 50%
then the uniqueness of the responses is guaranteed.
In this paper, we focus on PUF implementation issues in
reconfigurable devices and on the independency of bits in
the response. Reconfigurable devices are intensively used for
implementing cryptographic algorithms on hardware due to
the “reconfigurable” property of such circuits. Thus we have
to deal with two objectives: to keep the reconfigurable property
of FPGAs and to guarantee the uniqueness and reliability of
a PUF. In other words, if the PUF response changes when the
device is reconfigured, the uniqueness and reliability of a PUF
are questionable. We analyze and propose some enhancements
of the concept introduced in 2007 by Suh et al. [18]. This
principle is a ring oscillators based PUF (RO-PUF). It was
chosen for our experiments, because it is one of the most
suitable for implementation in FPGAs, independently from the
technology. The PUF uses a relatively high number of ring
oscillators in order to emphasize the intrinsic characteristics
of ICs and extract the signature. The principle is based on the
fact that the frequency of ROs depends on gate and routing
delays determined partially in an uncontrolled way by the
manufacturing process.
In the first part of our work, we had to deal with implementa-
tion issues related to the mapping of the PUF to various FPGA
technologies. We found out that, contrary to what original
authors stated [18], the placement and routing constraints play
a very important role (even when ROs are identically laid
out) in the design of the function, especially if one wants
to obtain sufficient inter-chip variability. The precise control
of the initial phase of ROs and careful design of frequency
comparators is another important issue that determines the
precision of the function and thus reduces intra-chip variations.
This was not discussed before. Furthermore, in the response
there are bits that are dependent one to each others. We
propose a method justified by mathematical means in order
to identify which pairs of ROs we have to select to ensure
independency of bits in the response. The main disadvantage
of the original design is the high power consumption. We
propose a simple modification enabling significant power
economy. Finally, during our experiments we observed a very
important phenomenon that has a significant impact on the
generated results and that was completely neglected in the
original design: the existence of a mutual dependence between
the ROs can lead sometimes to their mutual locking in FPGAs.
It is essential to take into account this unavoidable behavior
of ROs in the PUF design.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II we present related
work on PUFs implementation and metrics used to measure the
quality of a PUF. Section III deals with PUF design issues and
with the first problem stated: the need of manual placement
and routing of the design. Then we remark that some bits
in the response might be dependent due to an inappropriate
selection of ROs. An example of such a situation and a model
of RO pair selection is proposed in Sect. IV and a method to
identify pairs that will give independent bit in the response
is provided. Section V presents results of implementation of
the RO PUF in main FPGA technologies and analyzes the
quality of the PUF in relationship to the selected technology
and the quality of the evaluation board. It also evaluates the
impact of the mutual dependence of rings on the reliability of
the PUF. Section VI proposes some important enhancement of
the function and finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PUF BACKGROUND
A. Source of Noise in Electronic Devices
From its manufacturing to its usage, an electronic device
is faced with many sources of noise coming from different
processes and having different signification from one to an-
other. We can distinguish at least three classes of sources of
randomness:
• In manufacturing process: this noise is due to variation in
the silicon layers during the manufacturing process. Once
the device is manufactured, it contains these informations
wich are specific to each integrated circuit. An ideal PUF
should be built to extract the maximum amount of this
manufacturing noise in order to identify a circuit.
• Local noise: this noise appears when the circuit is
working. It is due to the random thermal motion of
charge carriers. This noise is very suitable for random
number generation but inappropriate for PUF. It should
be reduced compared to manufacturing noise to decrease
the intra-chip variation.
• Global environmental noise: this noise comes from envi-
ronmental condition (e.g. global temperature and voltage)
when the circuit is working. This noise can disrupt the
PUF response and increase the intra-chip variation mak-
ing a circuit idenfication more difficult to perform. Fur-
thermore, this source of noise can be easily manipulated
from outside. Therefore, PUFs must be developped in
order to reduce the influence of this global environmental
noise.
B. Related Works and PUF Evaluation
Several concepts of PUF and implementation in reconfig-
urable devices have already been introduced until now. In
[8], the random initialization of SRAM cells in FPGAs is
used to generate a specific signature. But in recent FPGAs,
manufacturers tend to initialize SRAM cells to a known value
that make SRAM cells based PUF difficult to use. A similar
idea is used on FPGA flip-flops and is based on their initial
unstable states [11]. Other PUFs are based on differences in
the silicon layers of the device leading to differences between
delay paths [18],[7],[12]. The main difficulty in these last
designs is to guarantee a perfect symmetry on delay paths in
order to exploit the slight differencies due to the manufacturing
process. Furthermore the placement and routing must be done
carefully to exploit the noise due to manufacturing process.
In most of these PUFs, delay paths are implemented with ROs
(RO-PUFs). In [13], a new approach is studied in order to
use RO-PUF. The so-called Compensation Method permits to
reduce the influence of unsuitable source of noise on the PUF
response. It is realized with Configurable ROs (CROs). One
disadvantage pointed by the authors is the reduction of the
maximum number of independent bits that can be extracted
from such a PUF leading to an increase in the number of ROs
that should be used.
As mentioned in introduction, PUF quality is evaluated by
its uniqueness and its reliability. In [13], authors proposed two
metrics. These metrics cannot directly give the characterization
of inter-die variation process which can only be estimated
based on PUF responses. Thus it depends greatly on how
the PUF is implemented to extract the maximum amount of
manufacturing noise.
Let (i, j) be a pair of chips with i 6= j and Ri (resp. Rj) the
n−bit response of chip i (resp. chip j). The first metric is the
average inter-die Hamming Distance (HD) among a group of
k chips and is defined as:
Inter − dHD(k) =
2
k(k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
HD(Ri, Rj)
n
×100%
(1)
This distance should converge to 50% in the case of an ideal
PUF.
The second metric introduced by the authors of [13] is used to
ensure the reliability of a PUF. An n−bits response is extracted
from chip i (Ri) at normal operating conditions. Then at a
different operating condition (different temperature or different
voltage), x samples (R′i,y)y∈{1,...,x} of the response of the
same PUF at this operating conditions are extracted. The
average intra-die HD over x samples for the chip i is defined
as:
Intra− dHD(x, i) =
1
x
x∑
y=1
HD(Ri, R
′
i,y)
n
× 100% (2)
This distance should be close to 0% to ensure reliable re-
sponses from the PUF in a given chip at various operating
conditions.
In [10], a deeper analysis on a special PUF (the Arbiter
PUF that was originally proposed in [12]) evaluation lead
the author to consider 4 indicators on the evaluation of the
intra-chip variation (Randomness, Steadiness, Correctness and
Diffuseness). For the inter-chip variation the metric used is
also the uniqueness (expressed differently than in [13]). Even
if measurements of Uniqueness and Reliability seem sufficient
to qualify a PUF, it can be interesting to go further (especially
in the case of an unexpected high intra-chip variation).
III. PUF DESIGN ISSUES
A. Principle of the PUF and its implementation in FPGA
In the principle of the PUF published in [18] that was
selected for our experiments, N identically laid-out ROs are
placed on the IC. Slight differences between their frequencies
will appear because of the unavoidable differences in the
silicon layers of the semiconductor device caused by the
manufacturing process. Pairs of oscillators are chosen one after
another and their frequencies compared. The response of the
PUF is equal to 1 if the first RO is faster and 0 otherwise.
The RO PUF in Fig. 1, as not many details were given
by the authors in [18], is realized using 32 ROs controlled
by an enable signal for all selected technologies (ALTERA,
XILINX, ACTEL). Two counters are used to define the winner
of the race by counting N periods of the two generated clock
signals: if one of the two counters (the winner of the race)
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reaches a predefined value N, the arbiter stops the race and
saves its result in the shift register. The principle of the race
arbiter is depicted in Fig. 2. Once one of counters reached the
maximum value N, it sets its output signal ”finished” to 1. This
value causes that the ”done” signal of the winning counter is
also set to 1 and it blocks the ”done” signal of the second
counter, which cannot be set any more. This means that the
race can have only one winner, pointed out by the OR gate
(0 for counter 2, 1 for counter 1). Once the race result was
obtained and saved, the oscillation and counter could restart
using the same control signal (enable).
When compared with the original principle published in
[18], the proposed principle is more precise - it can recognize
differences that are smaller than 1 bit, so the counting period
can be shorter and the PUF response faster. In our experiments,
we used 10-bit counters and the most significant bit was used
as the output signal (signal ”finished”) of the counter.
The output of the PUF presented in Fig. 1 is 1 bit wide.
In order to obtain a wider response, we use a shift register
with a 16 bit output. To get more responses at once, the
challenge generator is included in the design. It is a simple 8-
bit counter incremented after each race. For each value of the
challenge generator, two different oscillators are chosen for
comparison. They are separated in two groups of 16 (group
A and group B). The output of the counter is divided in
two parts: 4 Least Significant Bits (LSB) selecting one of 16
ROs in group A and 4 Most Significant Bits (MSB) selecting
one of 16 ROs in group B. Thus, every oscillator in group
A is compared to all oscillators in group B. This way, we
obtain 16x16=256 different challenges thus 256 responses of
1 bit for each device. For simplicity, we consider that each
IC delivers 256-bit responses. The generated bit-streams are
sent to the PC using a USB interface. For this reason, a
small USB module featuring a Cypress EZ-USB device was
connected to the evaluation board containing FPGA. A 16-bit
communication interface with this module was implemented
inside the FPGA. A Visual C++ application running on the PC
reads the USB peripheral and writes data into a text file. For
both ALTERA and XILINX technology, delay elements of the
ROs are implemented using Look Up Tables (LUTs). Finally,
one NAND2 gate that is necessary to obtain oscillations, closes
the loop and provide the structure with an enable signal.This
configuration allows the use of either an odd or even number of
delay elements. Thus, the ROs used in the design are made of
7 delay elements and one NAND2 gate in order to fit the ring
into one LAB. In ACTEL technology, the oscillators employ 7
AND2 gates as delay elements and a NAND2 gate as a control
gate.
B. Implementation results and tests
As resources in FPGAs have increased in volume and
performances, integrated development environments (IDE) are
charged with automatic placement and routing. This is very
convenient in common applications. The design can be trans-
lated into a significant number of logic elements, thus with
automatic placement and routing, the user gains time and
the surface of the IC is used at its maximum capacity. The
compiler used by these environments calculates the optimal
disposition of logic cells.
The RO PUF presented in [18] exploits, as any other PUF,
the intrinsic characteristics of an IC. By definition, the position
of the PUF on the IC determines the set of challenge-response
pairs. RO placed in LAB A will most probably not oscillate
at the same frequency as RO placed in LAB B. In order to
use this PUF for the authentication process or as a secret key
generator, one must be sure that the response of the PUF will
be the same under any environmental conditions and even
more important, after each reconfiguration of the device.
The first tests were conducted on ALTERA DE1 boards
including Cyclone II EP2C20F484C7N FPGA. We used the
PUF to authenticate the devices available in the laboratory. It
allowed us to identify a given IC between the 13 available.
As expected, we were able to perform this operation on
all the devices: both inter- and intra-chip variations were
in normal ranges. However, authors insisted that the design
needed no further placement and routing constraints in [18],
page 3: “[. . . ] there is no need for careful layout and routing.
For example, the paths from oscillator outputs to counters do
not need to be symmetric”. While it is clear that ROs must be
identically laid-out (which is achieved thanks to a macro in
[18]), it is questionable that extra logic arround the ROs (e.g.
the race arbiter) needs no placement and routing constraints.
We can imagine the next scenario: in order to control royalties,
the IP vendor wants to use a PUF for linking the IP licence to
a concrete FPGA device. However, a while later, he needs to
make an upgrade of his IP function, still related to the same
device and the same PUF response. This means that he needs
that the response of the PUF block will be independent of the
rest of the design.
We evaluated the impact of the changes in surrounding
logic on the PUF response. First, we added a new counter
block module. Since it was independent of the PUF, it should
not change the PUF response. Contrary to all expectations,
instead of obtaining almost the same response of the PUF
(i. e. obtaining small intra-chip variation), the device gave
completely different response so that presumably low intra-
chip variation after addition of the additional logic was almost
as high as an ideal inter-chip variation: 48,8% of the response
bits changed. We have to stress here, that the placement and
routing of ROs was constrained, but not the structure of the
arbiter.
In the next experiment, we kept initial PUF and sent its
output, as before, towards the USB module and addionally
towards a 7-segment display available on ALTERA DE1
board. While we were still maintaning the placement and
routing for ROs, we got another (the third) response of the
PUF for the same device! The responses for three projects
including the same PUF in the same device are depicted in
Tab. I.
Response n◦ 1 031f031f031f0005573f031f031f471f
(only the PUF) 573f031f011fd73ff7bf431f0117031f
Response n◦ 2 010000004df20000000045a04de245e0
(PUF and counter) 45a0fff70000000045e0fff745e045e0
Response n◦ 3 0007600f7eef7eef200fffff724f704f
(only the PUF and 600f0007600f7eef0005000772ef0007
an extra output)
TABLE I
RO PUF RESPONSES FOR THREE PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED IN THE SAME
DEVICE (ROS WERE CONSTRAINED BUT NOT THE RACE ARBITER)
C. Imposing placement & routing solution for response sta-
bilization
The above mentioned results show that the optimization
performed by the compiler implies different placement and
routing for the race arbiter after each recompilation.
As we need to have the minimal intra-chip variation even
for project upgrades, this is of extreme importance. Different
placement of the race arbiter implies different PUF and
different intrinsic characteristics that are explored. In both
targeted processes (authentication and key generation) this is
not acceptable. Therefore, imposing placement and routing
constraints on the whole PUF block is mandatory in order to
obtain a response independent from architecture modifications
in a reconfigurable device.
Once placement and routing constraints were applied on
both ROs and arbiter structure, the PUF provided excellent
and expected responses. Table II presents results of three
projects including the same PUF in the same device. Only
few differences exist (printed in bold).
IV. BIT DEPENDENCY IN THE PUF RESPONSE
In section III-A, we presented the way we selected pairs of
oscillators to obtain a 256-bit response. We have to evaluate
Response n◦ 1 ea09ebf9ea09ebfbea09eb59ebfbeb79
(only the PUF) ea09ebfbfffffbffeb79ea49ebfb0001
Response n◦ 2 ea09ebf9ea09ebfbea09ea69ebfbeb79
(PUF and counter) ea09ebfbfffffbffeb79ea49ebfb0001
Response n◦ 3 ea09ebf9ea09ebfbea09ea59ebfbeb79
(only the PUF and ea09ebfbfffffbffeb79ea19fbfb0001
an extra output)
TABLE II
RO PUF RESPONSES FOR THREE PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED IN THE SAME
DEVICE (ROS AND RACE ARBITER WERE CONSTRAINED)
how many bits are independent in the PUF response. For
example, consider 2 ROs a, b in group 1 and two other ROs
c, d in group 2. The comparisons are (a, c), (a, d), (b, c) and
(b, d), giving 4 possible bits in the response. But if a > c,
c > b, b > d, then we can predict a > d, so there are only 3
bits of information instead of 4 in this example.
In the following, we propose to compute how many bits in the
response are independent. This could help RO-PUF designers
to select pairs of ROs.
A. Generalization
Let (a1, . . . , an) be the first group of ROs and (b1, . . . , bn)
be the second group of ROs. We use the relation x > y
when RO x is faster than RO y. In most of cases, ROs
in group 1 (resp. in group 2) are not sorted thanks to the
relation >. However it exists a permutation σ ∈ Sn (resp.
σ′ ∈ Sn) such as aσ(1) > aσ(2) > · · · > aσ(n) (resp.
bσ′(1) > bσ′(2) > · · · > bσ′(n)).
We define the matrix of all comparison results between one
RO in group 1 and one RO in group 2. Matrix rows are
indexed by (aσ(1), . . . , aσ(n)) and matrix columns are indexed
by (bσ′(1), . . . , bσ′(n)).
Compn =


c1,1 c1,2 . . . c1,n
c2,1 c2,2 . . . c2,n
...
...
. . .
...
cn,1 cn,2 . . . cn,n


where ci,j =
{
0 when aσ(i) ≤ bσ′(j)
1 when aσ(i) > bσ′(j)
(3)
Because (aσ(i))i and (bσ′(j))j are sorted, if aσ(i) ≤ bσ′(j),
then for all k ≥ i, aσ(k) ≤ bσ′(j) because aσ(i) > aσ(k). In
other words if ci,j = 0 then for all k ≥ i, ck,j = 0.
Similarly, if aσ(i) > bσ′(j), then for all l ≥ j, aσ(i) > bσ′(l)
because bσ(j) > bσ(l). In other words, if ci,j = 1 then for each
l ≥ j, ci,l = 1.
Among the 2n
2
possible matrices, only matrices with general
term ci,j following the two rules:
1) if ci,j = 0 then for all k ≥ i, ck,j = 0
2) if ci,j = 1 then for each l ≥ j, ci,l = 1
can be obtained when comparing pairs of ROs. The others
denote antagonist comparisons that cannot appear (e.g. a > c,
c > b, b > d and a < d which is impossible).
B. Number of possible matrices
Let Mm,n be the number of possible matrices Mm,n with
m rows and n columns. By symmetry of the role played by
(ai)i and (bj)j it is obvious that Mm,n = Mn,m.
By convention, we set ∀n ∈ N, M0,n = 1 = Mn,0, thus we
have the following recursive relation giving Mm,n (m ≤ n):
Mm,n =
m∑
i=0
Mi,n−i ×Mm−i,i (4)
To prove this relation, we write the matrix with four blocks
for i from 0 to m:
Mm,n =
(
Ai,n−i Bi,i
Cm−i,n−i Dm−i,i
)
with block Bi,i necessarily filled with 1s and block Cm−i,n−i
necessarily filled with 0s. This can be explained by building
first matrices.
For example, for i = 0 we have:
Mm,n = (Cm,n) =


0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0


Then the only location to set a one in the matrix is the upper
right corner. Indeed, if we set a 0 instead then the last column
will be filled with 0s according to rule 1). In this case, it is
impossible to set a 1 elsewhere in a line of the matrix because
according to rule 2), it would force a 1 in the last column in
the same line which is impossible. For i = 1 we have:
Mm,n =


A1,n−1 1
0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0
Dm−1,1


with M1,n−1 matrices for A1,n−1 and Mm−1,1 for Dm−1,1
for a total of M1,n−1 × Mm−1,1 possible matrices in this
configuration. The next configuration is obtained with a 1 in
the upper right corner of block Cm−1,n−1 and following rules
1) and 2) the 2×2 block B2,2 is necessarily filled with 1s. So
the next configuration will be the study of all possible matrices
of the shape
Mm,n =


A2,n−2
1 1
1 1
0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0
Dm−2,2


then for i = 3 possible matrices with a 1 in the upper right
corner of block Cm−2,n−2, and so on until i = m where the
last possible matrice has the form:
Mm,n =


1 . . . 1
...
. . .
...
1 . . . 1


Thus for i from 0 to m we count all the possible matrices
Ai,n−i and Dm−i,i following the two previously mentionned
rules. For each i, there areMi,n−i possible matrices for Ai,n−i
and Mm−i,i matrices for Dm−i,i. Thus, there are Mi,n−i ×
Mm−i,i possible matrices for a given i. The sum over i gives
the formula in Eq. 4.
Using this formula in our context (two groups with the same
number n of ROs), there are Mn,n possible matrices. Then
log2(Mn,n) gives the number of independent comparisons we
can perform to get independent bits in the response.
For n = 16 ROs in each group, we got (only) M16,16 =
601080390 authorized matrices among the 2256 possible. Then
only a mean of log2(M16,16) ≈ 29 comparisons lead to 29
independent bits in the PUF response (instead of 256). We
can deduce that we should have n = 135 ROs in each group
to get a PUF response with 256 independent bits.
C. Example
In the next example, we use the response in Tab. II. Due
to intra-chip variation, some bits change in the response. To
have only one representation of the response, we use a mean
over 64 PUF responses with the same challenge and we obtain
ea09ebf9ea09ebfbea09eb59ebfbeb79ea09ebfbfffffb
ffeb79ea49ebfb0001. If we analyze the response, we can
see repetitive patterns (e.g. ea09, ebf9, . . . ) meaning that
there are dependent bits in the response.
We can be more precise and give, in this configuration, the
number of bits that are independent in the PUF response.
We rewrite the PUF response column by column in a
16 × 16 matrix, with rows from top to bottom a1, . . . , a16
and columns from left to right b1, . . . , b16.


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1


Then we have to transform this matrix with respect to the
two previous rules. We count the Hamming weight of each
line. Then we permute lines to obtain the Hamming weight
of line aσ(i) greater or equal than the one of line aσ(i+1) for
each i.
Old line index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Number of 1 15 15 15 2 15 1 15 10 7 11 9 10 15 2 6 16
New index 2 3 4 14 5 16 6 9 12 8 11 10 7 15 13 1
We obtain:


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0


The same work is done with columns (Hamming weight of
column bσ′(j) is less or equal than the one of column bσ′(j+1)):
Column index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Number of 1 7 12 7 13 7 10 13 11 7 13 16 15 11 8 13 1
New index 2 10 3 11 4 7 12 8 5 13 16 15 9 6 14 1
Finally, we obtain the following matrix:


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


with σ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
16 1 2 3 5 7 13 10 8 12 11 9 15 4 14 6
)
which
is the permutation of rows and
σ′ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
16 1 3 5 9 14 6 8 13 2 4 7 10 15 12 11
)
which is
the permutation of columns. Thus, aσ(1) = a16 > bσ′(1) = b16
(upper left corner in the matrix) gives a one. Then other com-
parisons between aσ(1) and bσ′(j) for j > 1 give no additional
information because we know that they will give a 1. The next
comparison is between aσ(2) = a1 and bσ′(1) = b16 which
is a zero, menaning that a1 < b16. Then other comparison
between bσ′(1) and aσ(i) for i > 1 are useless because we
know that they will give a 0. In this way, we can identify
which comparisons are giving information (they are boxed in
the matrix). This also gives indexes of ROs that have to be
compared. In this special case, they are (aσ(1) = a16 and
bσ′(1) = b16, aσ(2) = a1 and bσ′(1) = b16, aσ(2) = a1 and
bσ′(2) = b1, . . . ). In our case, we have 31 suitable comparisons
and so 31 bits in the response that are independent (close to
the theoretical mean of 29 computed).
D. Comments on this method
This method is usefull to know how many bits are indepen-
dent in the PUF response. In particular, when the PUF is used
for cryptographic key generation, it indicates how many bits
of entropy you can expect in the response.
However the response has still 256 bits (including depen-
dencies) and can be used to compute inter-chip variation
between many devices of the same family. Due to intrinsic
parameters of each device, permutations of ring oscillators
will be different from one device to another, giving different
response and contributing to inter-chip variation.
For intra-chip variation, it is different. Permutations of ring
oscillators is related to the device and will obviously change
from one device to another. The number of independent bits
in the response and their positions will depend on each
device and our method permits to know precisely how many
independent bits are there and what are their positions. The
intra-chip variation must be computed on these bits.
The proposed method is used to analyze the PUF response
and not to change it. It has been implemented in software
in order to estimate the entropy of the generated sequence.
A hardware implementation could be possible and useful for
improving PUF response. This aspect was not studied in this
paper.
V. OBSERVATION OF THE PUF IN VARIOUS TECHNOLOGIES
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
A. Observing the PUF in ALTERA, XILINX and ACTEL
technologies
In order to compare different FPGA technologies, we would
need a huge number of devices for all of tested families.
Unfortunately, we had only cards with thirteen Altera Cyclone
II and four Cyclone III devices, five Xilinx Spartan 3, three
Xilinx Virtex 5 chips and five Actel Fusion FPGAs at our
disposal. For this reason, we used the biggest group of thirteen
Cyclone II FPGAs to verify the inter-chip variation. We used
results obtained in Sec. IV (i.e. a PUF response of 31 bits
in this case). The obtained value computed using Eq. 1 was
48.57% in average, which is close to the ideal value of 50%.
The intra-chip variation of the PUF was tested on four AL-
TERA Cyclone III EP3C25F256C8N ICs. These experiments
were conducted under variable temperature and voltage con-
ditions. Results have been prevailed for a temperature range
from 30 to 80◦ Celsius (see Fig. 3) and a voltage range from
0.9 to 1.3V for the nominal voltage of 1.2V (see Fig. 4).
In these two figures, the distribution of the number of bits (x-
axis) that changed between two different responses from the
same PUF is shown as a histogram. The doted line presents
the binomial distribution B(n, p), where n = 31 is the number
of bits of the response using the methodology presented in
Sec. IV and p = Intra− dHD(64, i) is the average intra-die
Hamming distance over 64 samples for the board tested.
Experiments show that intra-chip variation increases when
temperature increases. Furthermore, the behavior of the PUF
drifts from the binomial distribution. This is probably caused
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Fig. 3. Intra-chip variation on the same Cyclone III EP3C25F256C8N FPGA
for various temperatures
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
V=0.9V (Ave= 1.56 bits out of  31  bits,  5.04 %)
Number of unstable bits
fr
eq
u
en
cy
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
V=1V (Ave= 0.94 bits out of  31  bits,  3.02 %)
Number of unstable bits
fr
eq
u
en
cy
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
V=1.1V (Ave= 0.39 bits out of  31  bits,  1.26 %)
Number of unstable bits
fr
eq
u
en
cy
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
V=1.2V (Ave= 0.34 bits out of  31  bits,  1.11 %)
Number of unstable bits
fr
eq
u
en
cy
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
V=1.3V (Ave= 0.59 bits out of  31  bits,  1.92 %)
Number of unstable bits
fr
eq
u
en
cy
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
Fig. 4. Intra-chip variation on the same Cyclone III EP3C25F256C8N FPGA
for various voltages
by the influence of thermal noise which is more important as
temperature increases and superposes a normal distribution on
the binomial distribution.
The lowest intra-chip variation is obtained in the normal
operating conditions, both in voltage (1.2V ) and temperature
(30◦ Celsius).
In comparison to our previous results in [4], intra-chip vari-
ations was underestimated because the mean was computed
on a 256 bits response ignoring dependency between bits.
According to our method, we identify 31 bits of infor-
mation in the response. Thus the intra-chip variation must
be computed on these bits. This explains why the ratio
intra-chip variation in [4]
intra-chip variation in this paper
≈ 25631 .
The PUF was also tested on XILINX Spartan 3
XC3S700ANn, on XILINX Virtex 5 XC5VLX30T and on
ACTEL Fusion M7AFS600 FPGA devices. Experimental re-
sults confirm the fact that placement constraints are mandatory.
Intra-chip variation for these devices are presented in Tab. III
For ACTEL technology, the tests were performed on
ACTEL Fusion M7AFS600 FPGA. The intra-chip variation
Device Cyclone III Spartan 3 Virtex 5 Fusion
Intra-chip variation 0.92% 0.81% 3.38% 13.5%
TABLE III
INTRA-CHIP VARIATION FOR DIFFERENT DEVICES IN NOMINAL
CONDITIONS
Fig. 5. Locked ring oscillators. Trigger on top signal.
reaches 13.5%! This technology presents the highest intra-chip
variation which is unexploitable for IC authentication. One
of the reasons for which we think the intra-chip variation is
higher for these boards is the fact that they present more noise
than the other ones. We observed a peak at 20MHz in the core
voltage spectrum, caused probably by some internal oscillator
embedded in ACTEL FPGA. Similar peak was not detected
in other technologies. These results show that the quality of
this PUF is strongly related to the quality of the device and
the board. In this precise case, the intrinsic characteristics of
the IC are overwhelmed by the noise and the results are far
from being ideal.
B. PUF and mutual relationship between rings
While studying properties of ROs, we observed that ROs
influence one another sometimes to an unexpected extent. If
the ROs are identically laid-out, their oscillating frequencies
are almost the same. The differences are caused by the intrinsic
characteristics of the IC as well as by the noise. If the
frequencies are so close that the current peaks caused by rising
and falling edges overlap, the ROs can lock and oscillate at
the same frequency, either in phase or with a phase shift.
Figure 5 shows output waveforms of two ROs that are
locked (both waveforms are visible) and Fig. 6 shows ROs that
are not locked (the second waveform is not observable). Note
that the oscilloscope was synchronized on the first waveform.
One can argue that the mutual dependence of rings could be
caused by the FPGA input/output circuitry. In order to avoid
influencing the results by outputting the signals from FPGA,
we used simple circuitry permitting to detect the locking. The
signals delivered by the two ROs were fed into the D flip-flop:
one of them to the data input and the other to the clock input.
If the output of the flip-flop is constant (’1’ or ’0’) then the
oscillators are locked.
The observation of numerous rings confirmed the fact that
Fig. 6. Unlocked ring oscillators. Trigger on top signal.
the mutual dependence of oscillators is big enough for them
to lock and oscillate at the same frequency. We could also
observe that independent oscillators at moment t0 can become
locked at moment t1 if external conditions (temperature,
voltage) present even slight changes.
If the challenge sent to the PUF selects a pair of oscillators
that are locked, then the response is no longer based on
intrinsic characteristics of the IC. Frequencies are identical,
therefore the bit should not be valid. This depends however
on the method employed for frequency measurement. In our
design, if the ROs are locked with a phase shift, the rising
edge of the RO with an advance will always be counted
before the rising edge of the second RO. Thus, the result of
the evaluation will always show that this RO has a greater
oscillating frequency. If the oscillators are locked without a
phase shift, the two counters will finish at the same time and
the bit will be declared not valid.
This rises an important question on the quality of the
response delivered by the PUF. If the oscillators are locked
at the moment we compare their frequencies the response is
deterministic and no longer based on intrinsic characteristics
of the device.
Identically laid-out oscillators request manual placement of
the delay elements, as argued earlier. This means that the user
will impose the position of the ROs on the device. Experimen-
tal results on the PUF showed that in certain configurations
the distribution of ’1’s and ’0’s in the response was not
uniform at all. In other configurations, the response presented
a better distribution of values. Thus, we studied the locking
phenomenon for ROs in certain configurations occupying
the smallest area possible. These configurations were chosen
because the surface of the PUF should be relatively small
comparing to the rest of the logic implemented in the device.
Moreover, the PUF needs to be implemented in an isolated
zone so that additional logic has only minimum influence on
the response.
We tested two particular configurations, ROs grouped in
a compact block, as presented in Fig. 7 and ROs placed on
two columns as presented in Fig. 8. In this case one column
represents one group of ROs.
Experimental results show that in the first configuration,
Fig. 7. Configuration of ROs in a compact block.
Fig. 8. Configuration of ROs in 2 columns
there are more chances to have locked ROs. The most probable
Voltage (V) Number of RO locked (over 16 ROs)
0.95-1.15 0
1.20-1.25 2
1.30 4
1.35-1.40 8
TABLE IV
LOCKING OF ROS DEPENDING ON VOLTAGE
explanation for this phenomenon is that ROs placed close to
each others are powered by the same wires. This fact has a
great influence on the behavior of the oscillators. In Tab. IV we
present the influence of the voltage on the locking of the ROs
on Cyclone III IC. Considering these experimental results, we
cannot determine with precision the conditions under which
ROs lock. We only observed that pairs of ROs can lock or
unlock if environmental conditions change. Thus, questions
rise on the reliability of the PUF and as manual placement is
required, the configuration of the oscillators and the placement
and routing of both ROs and arbiter must be carefully studied.
In a recent publication by Maiti and Schaumont [13], the
“Compensation method” used to select pairs of ROs in order
to have good PUF properties, indicate to chose ROs as close
as possible from one to each others. Even if more investigation
should be done on the locking of RO, such a method seems
to be exposed to this phenomenon.
VI. FURTHER ENHANCEMENTS OF THE PUF
Next, we propose some modifications of the PUF in order
to enhance its characteristics.
A. Reduction of intra-chip variations
As we observed in Session V, changing environmental
conditions (namely voltage and temperature) increase the intra-
chip variation. This is due to the fact that identically laid-out
ROs have very close oscillation frequencies. Since all ROs
do not have exactly the same dependence on environmental
conditions, some ROs can be more affected than others, and
differences in frequencies can invert. While for laboratory
temperatures the intra-chip variation did not exceeded 4 bits,
for temperature ranges from 30 to 80◦ Celsius, up to 15 bits
out of 256 were unstable. For device authentication this is not
a problem if the inter-chip variation remains high. For key
generation this fact is not acceptable. We must guarantee the
uniqueness of the key generated by the device. Therefore, as
proposed by Suh and Devadas, an error correcting code can
be used to correct errors due to the intra-chip variation. As
usual, the response should not be used directly as a key even
after correcting the errors. On one hand, there are weak and
periodic patterns in the response. On the other hand, after this
error correcting process, the entropy of the “key” will probably
be reduced. A hash function (e.g. Whirlpool [3] based on
a modified AES) can be used to remove weak patterns but
unfortunately it cannot solve the problem of entropy reduction.
B. Reduction of the power consumption
When dealing with the power consumption of the PUF,
we used small dedicated modules made in our laboratory
featuring ALTERA Cyclone III EP3C25F256C8N FPGA. We
measured the static current consumption of the module and
obtained 4 mA. Then we measured the consumption of the
PUF using the 32 ROs and a PLL delivering the clock signal.
The module consumed 24.7 mA, which is indeed considerable
for a background function such as PUF. However, the PUF
employs each time only two out of N ROs in order to obtain
one bit of the response. Thus, we propose to stop all the N−2
oscillators (30 in our case) that are currently not used for
the response bit. The ROs are enabled and stopped using the
enable input of the structure (Fig. 1). When only two ROs
were running, we measured a 13.4 mA current consumption.
This is a reduction of consumption by approximately 51%.
In the next paragraph, we estimate the approximate power
reduction that can be obtained in the design proposed in
[18]. The total power consumption represents the sum of the
static consumption (S), the consumption of the logic which
is independent of the number of ROs (i.e. PLL, counters,
comparators, . . . ) (L) and the consumption of the logic which
depends almost linearly on the number of ROs (multiplexers
and ROs) denoted by R(N) = λ×N where N is the number
of ROs and λ a constant float. We can make a simple calculus
and show that the improved model would probably reduce
considerably the consumption of the board.
In [18], Suh and Devadas used 1024 ROs in their design.
Then, if we shutdown unused ROs for each comparison, we
should obtain a consumption of approximately S+L+λ×2 =
13.4 mA instead of S + L + λ × 1024 = 397.6 mA. With
our improved PUF control, we obtain a current consumption
reduction of 1 − 13.4/397.6 = 96.6%. The PUF’s power
consumption thus becomes much more suitable for practical
implementations.
Such an idea for reducing self-heating has been proposed in
[16] but was not considered by Suh and Devadas in their
design. However, in this article only one ring is selected at
a time. This idea cannot be used in our proposal to save more
power consumption. If we want to use only one RO, we have
to count its number of raising edges during one enable time,
record this number and repeat this measurement by selecting
another RO during the same enable time. The main problem
in such a case is the influence of the global deterministic
part of the jitter on the frequency of one ring oscillator [6].
This influence will not be the same from one measurement to
another. Thus the comparison between the number of raising
edges of two ROs will be suitable only if they are influenced
by the same global deterministic part of the jitter in the same
time.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The concept introduced in [18] is very simple, with a
differential structure that presents an excellent behavior as
long as the IC is not reconfigured. As this structure (the PUF)
is useless if implemented alone in an IC, we analyze the
influence of additional logic upon the response of the PUF.
Our work proves that placement and routing constraints are
required in order to maintain the quality of the PUF in FPGAs.
Without any constraints, additional logic creates a completely
different PUF and implicitly a completely different response.
Instead of a small and acceptable intra-chip variation after the
IC reconfiguration, we obtained the variation 48.8% that was
comparable in size to an ideal inter-chip variation (50%).
We also showed that bits in the response are dependent and
propose a method to select pairs of ROs to have independent
bits. Unfortunately this shorten the PUF response. The huge
current consumption obtained by Suh et al was also of our
concern. We improved the design in order to considerably
reduce the consumption. For a small PUF, (e.g. the one
described in our experimental conditions with 32 ROs) the
consumption was reduced by 51%. For a greater PUF, our
improvement leads to an even more important reduction: we
reduced the consumption of the PUF described in [18] by
96.6%.
Moreover, we showed that there are other phenomena that
influence and jeopardize the integrity of the PUF. We argued
why the “locking” phenomenon is affecting the response
of the PUF and it is very important to notice that not all
challenges can be used at any moment. Apart from the locking,
our experimental results show that noisy mother-boards can
increase the intra-chip variation for the PUF.
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